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FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD PROCEDURE
AND THE LEGALITY OF DUAL RATE
SHIPPING CONTRACTS*
THE exclusive patronage dual rate contract is a device employed by many
shipping conferences to induce shippers to restrict their trade to carriers who
are conference members.1 Under this type of contract, a shipper agreeing
to move his goods exclusively in conference carriers receives a percentage
reduction from the non-contract rate, regardless of the volume of goods
shipped.2 The contract discourages a shipper from using non-conference
carriers, since a single defection normally means that he must make a
substantial penalty payment 3 and that he is deprived of the future benefits
of the reduced rates.
4
Section 15 of the Shipping Act requires that rate agreements between
carriers must be filed with the Federal Maritime Board,5 and provides that
*Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismisscd
stb om. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 336 U.S. 941 (1949);
96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nora. A/S J. Ludwig
2Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co.,.342 U.S. 950 (1952); 211 F.2d 51. (D.C. ar.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
1. A shipping conference is an association of water freight carriers loosely joined
together to regulate competition, stabilize operations, and provide other mutual benefits. See
MARx, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTEns 3 (1953).
Of the 105 conferences now using American ports, 62 employ dual rate systems. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari filed by FMB, p. 21, Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F2d 51
(D.C. Cir. 1954). See also MAnx, op. cit. supra, at 50-51, 207. For purposes of dual rate
contracts, see generally MA&nx, op. cit. supra, at 207.
2. Percentages usually vary from 10-20% below the regular non-contract conference
rates. MARx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 202; ROSENTHAL, TECHNIQUES OF Inm.-ATioAL
TRADE, 43 n.6 (1950). See, e.g., First Isbrandtsen Case, 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(20%) ; Third Isbrandtsen Case, 211 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (9Y1%) ; Pacific Coast
European Conference Agreement, 3 U.S.M.C. 11, 14 (1948) (15%).
3. See MARx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 209; ROSENTHAL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 49.
Compare Pacific Coast European Conference Agreement, 3 U.S.M.C. 11 (1954) (repay-
ment of all rebates previously received held unlawful), ilth Isbrandtsen Co. v. North
Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B. 235, 246 (1950) (percentage of price
of freight shipped might be valid).
4. MAax, op. cit. supra note 1, at 209; Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220,
222-23 (1939). But see Pacific_ Coast European Conference Agreement, 3 U.S.M.C. 11,
18 (1954) (shipper loses benefits only until payment of penalty).
S. 39 STAT. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. §814 (1952).
The Federal Maritime Board, established in 1950 by Reorganization Plan No. 21, 64
STAT. 1273 (1950), succeeded the United States Maritime Commission which had been
created by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 STAT. 1987 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1111
(1952). The Maritime Commission took over the functions performed by the Department
of Commerce under Executive Order No. 6166, § 12, June 10, 1933, 5 U.S.C. § 132 (1952)
(note). The Department of Commerce succeeded the United States Shipping Board, 39
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it is "unlawful to carry out" such agreements unless "approved" by the Board.0
Agreements lawful under the Act are granted an exemption from the anti-
trust laws3 Section 15 authorizes the FMB to "disapprove, cancel or
modify" agreements which it finds "unjustly discriminatory or unfair" as
between carriers or shippers or which are in violation of the Act,8 but
directs it to approve all other agreements.9 However, the Shipping Act fails
to define what constitutes FMB approval.
The recent cases of Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States 10 considered the requi-
sites of FMB approval of conference agreements establishing dual rate con-
tract systems. In 1948, the Board, without a hearing, authorized two such
conference agreements.' A district court in the First Isbrandtsen Case upheld
the contention of Isbrandtsen, a competing independent carrier, that it would
be "gravely prejudiced" by conference initiation of the dual rate system.12
The court therefore granted Isbrandtsen's request for a temporary injunction
against enforcement of the rates until the FMB had an opportunity to pass
upon the validity of the agreements in an "adversary proceeding."' ' The
Board subsequently approved the dual rates after a full hearing at which all
parties were represented. 14 The district court in the Second Isbrandisen Case,
although not questioning the sufficiency of the FMB hearing, permanently en-
joined the enforcement of the rates.' 5 It found that the conference rate system
approved by the Board had been based upon a concededly "arbitrary" rate
differential, without reference to an adequate standard, and was therefore
STAT. 729 (1916). For convenience, these various agencies are referred to herein as the
FMB.
6. 39 STAT. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1952).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. The FMB is also authorized to disapprove agreements which "operate to the
detriment of the commerce of the United States." Ibid. When the Board finds a rate or
practice to be "unjust or unreasonable," it is empowered to prescribe and order enforce-
ment of one which is "just and reasonable." 39 STAT. 735 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1952).
9. 39 STAT. 733 (1916),46 U.S.C. § 814 (1952).
10. 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed sub norm. A/S J. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 336 U.S. 941 (1949); 96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd by an, equally divided court sub nora. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952) ; 211. F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990
(1954).
11. Conference Agreements No. 4490-6 (Jan. 2, 1948) and No. 7920-1 (Aug. 24, 1948),
cited in Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
12. First Isbrandtsen Case, 81 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
For a brief summary of Isbrandtsen's diverse independent activities and long-tanding
opposition to shipping conferences, see Business Week, Oct. 17, 1953, pp, 1144118.
13. Id. at 546. The injunction was conditioned on Isbrandtsen's "diligent ptogccution"
of a complaint before the Board challenging the dual rate system. Id. at 547.
14. Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B. 235
(1950).
15. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd by
an equally divided court sub nora. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co.,
342 U.S. 950 (1952).
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"unjustly discriminatory."' 6 The FMB subsequently promulgated General
Order 76 requiring any conference filing a dual rate contract agreement for
approval to justify its use of such a system and specify its reasons for the
rate differential employed.' 7 Shortly thereafter, another conference in compe-
tition with Isbrandtsen filed its proposed dual rate system with the FMB.1s
Over the objections of Isbrandtsen and the Department of Justice, the
Board authorized immediate initiation of the system, granting a hearing at
a later date.' 9 On review in 1954, a court of appeals in the Third Isbrandtsen
Case again enjoined initiation of the dual rates pending a hearing, holding
that the FMB action allowing them to go into effect "prior to approval" violated
section 15.20 Following a full hearing,2 ' the Board is presently considering
this proposed dual rate system.2 2
Due to the conflict between the Board and the courts over the interpreta-
tion of FMB procedures, the legality of the dual rate contract systems in
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States has remained undecided for seven years.
It now seems clear that final FMB approval of conference agreements estab-
lishing dual rate systems is mandatory before they can become effective.m
16. Id. at 889.
17. General Order 76, 46 C.F.R. § 236.3 (Supp. 1952). Section 236.3 provides that
interested parties may file with the Board written comments concerning the rates together
with a request for a hearing.
In Contract Rates-North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 355
(1954), the FMB after hearing approved a dual rate agreement with a 10, differential
filed pursuant to General Order 76.
18. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211. F2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 990 (1954).
19. Id. at 54. The FMB order authorizing a dual rate system with a 9Y% differential
was based solely on information filed pursuant to General Order 76. Ibid.
20. Id. at 57. The court also held that the FMIB order allowing the rate system to go
into effect pending a hearing was a "final order" and therefore subject to judicial review,
citing the "immediate and incalculable" harm to Isbrandtsen's rights which the order would
bring about. Id. at 55-56. See note 31 infra.
The granting of judicial relief pending agency determination in the First and Third
Isbramdtsen Cases contrasts with earlier Supreme Court denials of injunctions in dual
rate cases on primary jurisdiction grounds. Even where conferences, in disregard of the
Shipping Act, failed to file their dual rate agreements, the Court held that the complainants
had to make prior resort to the Board before judicial action was possible. U.S. Navigation
Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 74 (1932); Far East Conference v. United States, 342
U.S. 570 (1952). Cunard may be distinguished if the Third Isbrandsen Case is viewed
merely as a review of prior final action by the FAIB. Moreover, Isbrandtsen was seeking
only to restrain the conference temporarily pending agency action, unlike the complainants
in Cunard and Far East Conference, who sought pernanent injunctions against initiation
of dual rate systems.
21. See Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, F.M.B. Docket No. 730 (Recom-
mended Decision of Robert Furness, Examiner) (Sept. 13, 1954).
22. The FMB has remanded the Examiner's Report for further findings prior to
Board consideration of the problem. Letter fromi Clarence G. Morse, General Counsel,
FMB, to the Yale Law Journal, Dec. 23, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library.
23. See Third Isbrandtsen Case, 211 F2d 51, 56-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denicd, 347
U.S. 990 (1954). The FMB has never denied that it was required to approve agreements
1955]
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Moreover, although there is no statutory provision for a hearing prior to
initiation of rate systems, courts have interpreted "approval" in section 15
as requiring an adversary proceeding if one is sought.24
The FMB has never had authority to regulate shipping rates, except indirectly
through its power to disapprove 'conference agreements. 5  Since the Board
cannot possibly scrutinize the large number of rates filed by carriers, its
practice has been to allow these rates to become effective upon submission. 0
To hold all shipping rates unlawful and enjoinable except upon FMB ap-
proval following a hearing would impose an extraordinarily heavy burden
on the Board 27 and would severely impair conference flexibility in adjusting
rates to meet changing economic conditions. 28  However, the Third
before they could become effective. However, its "approval" normally consisted only of
routine inspection of agreements and supporting information without a hearing. See
Ex parte 4, Section 15 Inquiry, 1 U.S.S.B. 121, 124 (1927); Third Isbrandtsen Case,
supra, at 54-55; notes 24, 26 infra.
24. Third Isbrandtsen Case, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dended, 347 U.S. 990
(1954). See also First Isbrandtsen Case, 81. F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dis-
missed sub inr. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 336 U.S. 941
(1949). Although the Third Isbrandtsen Case did not specifically state that the FMB was
required to hold an adversary hearing in order to approve the dual rate system, the apparent
grounds upon which the decision rested was the Board's failure to hold adversary proceed-
ings prior to its initiation.
Moreover, the court of appeals is directed to (1) "determine whether a [agency] hear-
ing is required by law" and (2) "p#ass upon the issues presented" when no hearing is re-
quired. 64 STAT. 1130 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1037 (1952). If a hearing had not been required
in the Third Isbrandtsen Case, the court under this section would have been required to
pass on the substantive issues.
Due process requires that a hearing be allowed at some period prior to the time when
governmental action becomes final. DAvis, Avxi xs ATivE LAW § 75 (1951). Section 23
of the Shipping Act requires orders of the FMB "relating to any violation" of the Act
to be made only after "full hearing." 39 STAT. 736 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 822 (1952). The
FMB's practice has been to hold a hearing if either the Board or any interested party
opposes a rate agreement. The Board has had no fixed practice concerning the time within
which such a hearing is held. And in the past, it has frequently allowed rate agreements
to go into effect temporarily pending a hearing. See ATrroRNEY GENERAL's Commirun
ON ADMINISTATIvE PROCEDURE 9, 13 (Monograph No. 4, 1940). The Shipping Act appears
to provide no specific authority for this procedure. See generally DAvis, op. cit. supra
§73 (1951).
25. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTRI.5 130-31, 295 (1953) ; ROSENTHAL, TECi.
NIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 50 (1950) ; Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by FMB,
p. 15, Third Isbrandtsen Case, 211 F.2d 51. (D.C. Cir. 1954); Second Isbrandtsen Case,
96 F. Supp. 883, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See generally S. REP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 84 (1950).
26. The FMB claims that it cannot possibly subject the approximately 2,000 rates filed
each month to anything more than perfunctory scrutiny. See Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari filed by FMB, supra note 25, at 18-20. The Board has authorized almost all rate
agreements as a routine matter. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEEI. ON AD1INISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 11-13 (Monograph No. 4, 1940) ; MARX, supra note 25, at 110-13.
27. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by FMB, supra note 25, at p. 19.
28. The necessity for conferences to be able to adjust rates promptly to changing eco-
nomic conditions was one of the reasons why the Shipping Act gave the FMB no affirma-
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Isbrandtsen Case may be read narrowly to require a hearing prior to approval
only for an agreement which embodies a comprehensive "new scheme of rate
combination and discrimination."2 9 The public interest in granting a blanket
antitrust exemption to these Shipping Act agreements would seem to require
that their approval be preceded by careful agency consideration. 0
Furthermore, prior FMB approval will probably result in more rapid
effectuation of conference rate systems. Reviewing courts have discretion
temporarily to enjoin administrative agency orders,3 ' and have exercised
this power upon a finding of "irreparable injury" even after full agency
hearings.32 However, it is less likely that such injury will be found once the
FMB, following a hearing, has approved the reasonableness of a particular
rate system.33 And FMB approval after a hearing will at least allow prompt
tive power of rate making. Report of the House Committee on the Uerchant Marine and
Fisheries, H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 309-11, 420-21 (1914) ; MARx, op. Ct.
supra note 25, at 130.
29. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211. F2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also Ex
parte 4, Section 15 Inquiry, 1 U.S.S.B. 121, 124-25 (1927).
30. See Third Isbrandtsen Case, supra note 29, at 57; Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570, 578 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
31. The court of appeals has "exclusive jurisdiction" to enjoin, set aside, or suspend
all "final orders" of the Federal Maritime Board. 64 STAT. 1129 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1032
(1952). A reviewing court may postpone the effective date of any agency action pending
conclusion of the review proceedings where necessary to prevent "irreparable injury." 60
STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(d) (1952). See also 64 STAT. 1131 (1950), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1039(b) (1952).
However, even in the absence of statute, it appears to be within the equity discretion
of federal courts to issue temporary injunctions pending either administrative determina-
tion or judicial review, on showing of irreparable injury. See Note, Interim Injunctive
Relief Pending Administrative Determination, 49 CoLum~. L. REv. 1124, 1126 (1949). For
cases in which temporary injunctions were issued pending administrative determinations,
see West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948) ;
Montana State Federation of Labor v. School District, 7 F. Supp. 82 (D. Mont 1934).
For cases where temporary injunctions were issued pending judicial review, see United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 290-95 (1947); Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935).
32. In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942), a
stay was granted pending completion of appellate review even following "extensive hear-
ings" by the FCC, to protect against "irreparable injury." For other cases in which ad-
ministrative agency orders made after hearings were enjoined pending judicial review,
see American Air Transport v. CAB, 206 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (CAB); United
States ex rel. Cammarata v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Immigration Ser-
vice); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 225 U.S. 306 (1912) (ICC).
33. The power to stay is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion. Scripps-
Howard Radio Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Railroad Com-
mission of Alabama, 208 Fed. 35 (M.D. Ala. 1913), a reviewing court, in denying a
temporary injunction, held that a "presumption of reasonableness" attached to an agency
order which had been issued following a hearing. Cf. Virginian Ry. v. United States,
272 U.S. 658,672-75 (1926).
Temporary injunctions have been denied following full agency hearings in Seas Ship-
ping Co. v. Cardillo, 86 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (FSA) ; Koppers Gas & Coke Co.
1955]"
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judicial review, thus preventing successive wasteful remands to the Board
for prior administrative determination of substantive issues.
3 4
Regardless of the procedure followed, it is questionable whether the FMB
had statutory authorization to approve the dual rate systems in the Isbrandt-
sen cases. Section 14(3) of the Shipping Act forbids a carrier to "retaliate
against any shipper" by resorting to "discriminating or unfair methods"
because that shipper has "patronized any other carrier."3 In Isbrandtsen,
the Board affirmed the position it has consistently taken-that this section
did not bar it from approving dual rate contract systems where necessary
and reasonable.30 And it claimed that conference use of such a system did
not constitute retaliation because it operated without "vengeance" against all
shippers who "voluntarily" failed to sign the contracts, whether or not they
patronized non-conference carriers.37 But, in Far East Conference v. United
States,33 two dissenting Supreme Court justices persuasively argued that
when a shipper was charged higher rates solely for failing to give his ex-
clusive patronage to the conference, he was "being retaliated against for
shopping around among carriers," and that section 14(3) therefore made any
dual rate contract system "illegal." 30
The Alexander Committee, whose report formed the basis for the Shipping
Act, recommended that such conference practices as deferred rebates and
"fighting ships" be flatly prohibited, 40 without making a similar recommenda-
v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 467 (D. Minn. 1953) (ICC). And see Truax-Traer Coal
Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 95 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1938); American
Air Lines v. Standard Air Lines, 80 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (CAB), where agency
orders made without hearings were enjoined pending administrative proceedings.
34. See text at notes 12-20 supra. This prior agency consideration of issues within
its area of special competence is required under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See
U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932). For an excellent discussion
and criticism of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, see Schwartz, Legal Resiriction of
Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67
HARv. L. Rav. 436, 438, 466, 471-74 (1954). For a contrary view, see von Mehren, The
Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67
HARv. L. REv. 929 (1954).
35. 39 STAT. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 812(3) (1952).
36. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B.
235, 239-44 (1950). For statements of the FMB's position, see Eden Mining Co. v. Blue-
fields Fruit & S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41, 46 (1922); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Stoomvaart, 1
U.S.S.B. 285, 293 (1933); Pacific Coast European Conference Agreement, 3 U.S.M.C.
11, 16 (1948).
37. Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B. 235,
242 (1950).
38. 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
39. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1952) (dissent by
Douglas and Black). The majority opinion, which remanded the case to the FMB on
grounds of primary jurisdiction, expressed no opinion as to the lawfulness of dual rate
contracts.
40. Report of the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H.R.
Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 421 (1914) (Alexander Report).
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tion with respect to dual rate contract systems. The Supreme Court appears
to have accepted the fact that the Committee investigated these systems with-
out expressly condemning them as evidence that Congress did not intend to
make dual rate contracts unlawful per se.41 However, dual rate contract
systems did not come into general use until after passage of the Shipping
Act.4 And the Committee's great concern about "discrimination between
shippers in the matter of rates," 43 coupled with its unqualified recommenda-
tions that this be "prohibited,"' seem to support the proposition that the
Committee would have specifically condemned dual rate systems if it had
considered them of enough significance.
An analogous provision of the Interstate Commerce Act flatly prohibiting
differing rates for similar services 45 has in the past been interpreted to
prohibit only those rate discriminations which were "unreasonable." 4 A like
interpretation of the Shipping Act would harmonize "discriminating" in sec-
tion 14(3) with "unjustly discriminatory" in Section 15.47 However, another
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, stating that carriers "shall not
discriminate" in rates betveen connecting rail lines,48 has been interpreted
to impose an absolute prohibition on such discrimination. 9 Under this con-
struction, section 14(3) would establish a strict standard of non-discrimina-
tion for the shipping industry.
41. See Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 307 n.3 (1937). The
Court quoted the Committee as "recognizing" that the dual rate system, in contrast to de-
ferred rebates, did not place shippers in "continual dependence" on the carrier. Ibid.
However, a careful reading of the Alexander Report, supra note 40, at 307, reveals no
such committee opinion, but only a comment that the above position was "argued." For
discussion of Swayne & Hoyt, see tex\t at notes 74-76 infra.
42. 1fAEM, IN=TRNA7ONAL SHIPPING C ARTs 210 (1953). One of the reasons for
the increased use of dual rate systems may have been the fact that the Shipping Act out-
lawed deferred rebates, the form of exclusive patronage contract previously most widely
used.
43. Alexander Report, op. cit. supra note 40, at 313.
44. Id. at 421. For discussion of the underlying purpose of the Shipping Act to pre-
vent "every form of favoritism," see Intercoastal Investigation, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 400, 451-52
(1935).
45. 24 STAT. 379-80 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §2 (1952).
46. See early decisions in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 219 (1896); ICC
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 276 (1892). See generally II SnArawmN, TnE
INTERSTATE ComMRcE Comissiox 443 (1931), III-B id. at 374-78, 381, 542-47, 556-57.
However, the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Elkins and Hepburn Acts, has
since been interpreted as ruling out all discrimination. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 478 (1911) ; Hocking Valley Ry. v. United States, 210 Fed. 735
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S. 757 (1914).
47. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B.
235, 242 (1950) (dictum).
48. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 54 STAT. 903 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 3(4) (1952),
formerly 49 U.S.C. § 3(3).
49. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 533, 538 (N.D.N.Y.
1937). The court contrasted this provision with a related provision, 24 STAT. 3S f (1887.,
1955]
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The FMB may also lack authority to approve dual rate contract systems
because they are either "unjustly discriminatory" or amount to the giving of
an "undue or unreasonable preference" in violation of sections 15, 16, and
17 of the Shipping Act. 0 But, in accordance with its recent tendency to
validate such agreements, 51 the Board upheld the reasonableness of the dual
rate systems in the Isbrandtsen cases on the grounds that these formal agree-
ments were "necessary" to the effective functioning of shipping conferences
and to the "dependability and stability" of freight rates and service. 2
Following the Second Isbrandtsen Case, which rejected an FMB-approved
arbitrary conference rate differential of twenty percent,5 3 the Board endorsed
a dual rate contract system with a duration of six months and a differential
of ten percent.5 4 It found that these contracts were not "coercive" but offered
shippers a reasonable "inducement" for their exclusive patronage without
"binding" them for an overly long periodY, The FMB also found that the
ten percent differential merely enabled the conference to meet Isbrandtsen's
rates, thus allowing shippers a "reasonable choice of carriers."5 0 It concluded
that the system was not designed to drive the independent carriers out of
business because they were free to join the conference at any time.57
The need for shipping conferences to stabilize and regulate the foreign
maritime trade has been well recognized. 8 Nevertheless, conferences have
been prohibited from initiating dual rate contract systems which had the
effect of achieving monopoly by excluding competing carriers." Yet the
as amended, 54 STAT. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1952), which forbade only "undue
or unreasonable preference [s]."
50. Sections 16, 17, 39 STAT. 734 (1916), 46 U.S.C. §§ 815, 816 (1952). For the pro-
visions of section 15, see text at notes 5-9 mtpra.
51. Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220 (1939), is the last reported
case of FMB invalidation of a dual rate system. Up to 1950, the FMB had affirmed sonic
32 such agreements. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Confer-
ence, 3 F.M.B. 235, 241 (1950) (dictum).
52. Isbrandtsen v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B. 235,
244-45 (1950) ; Contract Rates-North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B.
355, 371-72 (1954).
53. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
54. Contract Rates-North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 4 F.M.14. 355,
372-74 (1954).
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. According to Marx, Isbrandtsen has filed exact replicas of conference
agreements but with rates reduced. See MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTLS 180),
195-97 (1953). However, Isbrandtsen has claimed that it follows an independent rate
policy. Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, FMB Docket No. 730, p. 15 (Recom-
mended Decision of Robert Furness, Examiner) (1954).
57. Contract Rates-North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 355,
373-74 (1954).
58. See, e.g., SEN. RxiP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 84-86 (1950); MAix, op. cit.
supra note 56, at 299-304.
59. See Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220, 225-26 (1939); Gulf Inter-
coastal Contract Rates, I U.S.S.B.B. 524, 529-30 (1936), aff'd sub nor. Swayne & Hoyt,
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dual rate system appears by its very nature to have this exclusionary effect.cO
On most trade routes, the service offered by independent lines, such as Is-
brandtsen, is insufficient to move all the goods of large shippers.0 ' Therefore,
even though the independent and conference contract rates are identical,
these shippers have no real choice of carriers: they will be forced either to
deal exclusively with the conference or to ship a portion of their goods at
a competitive disadvantage with respect to goods of contracting shippers.G-
And although independent carriers have continued to compete even against
conferences employing dual rates,63 these systems could eventually cripple
them or drive them into the confeiences.0 4 The freedom of the independents
to join the conferences 65 does not disguise the effect of dual rates in hamper-
ing their independent operations. Although dual rate systems might possibly
be justified if necessary to preserve shipping conferences, the fact that many
Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937). Intercoastal Investigation, 1935, 1 U.S.S.B.B.
400, 452 (1935). In W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Stoomvaart, 1 U.S.S.B. 285 (1933), the FMB
approved a dual rate system instituted by a conference where there was a "choice" of
carriers as contrasted with one initiated by a single carrier in which there was no
such choice. See Eden M.fining Co. v. Bluefield Fruit & S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B.B. 41 (1922).
And the Board has never expressly repudiated this distinction. But cf. Intercoastal
Investigation, supra at 452. However, when all members of a conference are charging
the same rates, a shipper's choice of carriers may be illusory.
60. The FMB has admitted that the dual rate contract is "a device tending towards
the monpolization of ocean commerce." FMB Brief, Second Isbrandtsen Case, quoted at
96 F. Supp. 883, 888 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. V. United
States, 300 U.S. 297, 304 (1937), affirming 18 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D.D.C. 1936).
Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed. 529, 534 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), found that e-:clusive patron-
age contracts were coercive and tending toward monopoly, and therefore held them "not
only unreasonable but.., odious" at common law.
61. MAfx, op. cit. supra note 56, at 215. See also Trans-Pacific Freight Conference
of Japan, FMB Docket No. 743, finding of fact No. 56 (Oct. 1, 1954) (recommended
Decision of A. L. Jordan, Examiner).
62. See Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220, 226 (1939); Swauyne &
Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D.D.C. 1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 297 (1937).
63. According to the FMB, Isbrandtsen has "continued its operation" for a number
of years on one or more trade routes where dual rate systems were in force. Contract
Rates-North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 355, 374 (1954). See
also Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B. 235, 244
(1950).
Because numerous additional economic factors, such as relative efficiency of operation,
types of vessels competing, and amounts of freight available with relation to total carrier ca-
pacity, must he considered in weighing the effect of a dual rate system on an independent
carrier, the fact that he has continued to operate--standing alone--should not be taken as
conclusive.
64. See Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan, Docket No. 743, p. 31 (Oct. 1,
1954) (recommended Decision of A. L. Jordan, Examiner). See also Swvayne & Hoyt,
Ltd., v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D.D.C. 1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 297 (1937).
65. Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Compagnie Maritime Beige S.A., 2 U.S.M.C. 755,
760 (1946). See Pacific Coast European Conference, 3 U.S.M.C. 11, 14 (1948). See also
W. T. Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, 1 U.S.S.B. 285,290 (1933) ; MAPvx, op. cit. supra note 5, at
22-125.
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conferences have operated successfully without them would seem to cast sub-
stantial doubt on their necessity."
Under the dual rate system, a shipper contracts only to give his exclusive
patronage to the conference.6" Since the amount of patronage may vary
considerably during different periods, it is difficult to justify the contention
of the conferences and the FMB that the system facilitates planning or pro-
motes dependability of service." Contracts granting discounts for regularity
or quantity of consignments would seem to fulfill these functions more effec-
tively than dual rate contracts, and would be no less effective in stabilizing rates. 1'
These contract discounts do not necessarily have to be based on quantities
of such size as to give advantages to large shippers.70
The right of each shipper to be charged the same rates as other shippers
receiving identical services has been expressly held by the FMB to be pro-
vided by the Shipping Act.71 Under a dual rate system, the services fur-
nished to contract signers and non-signers are identical.7 2 Therefore any
difference in rates which is predicated solely upon exclusive patronage and
which bears slight relation to profits and costs seems unjustly discrinina-
tory. 3 In Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States,74 the Supeme Court found
66. For the number of conferences now using dual rate systems see note 1 su pra.
In Swayne & Hoyt, evidence showed that Intercoastal Conferences operated successfully
from Atlantic ports without the dual rate system even while conferences moving out of Gulf
coastal ports claimed they were necessary to assure stability. Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v.
United States, 300 U.S. 297, 305 (1937). However, numerous independent economic factors
must also be considered. See note 63 supra. See also MARx, op. cit. supra note 56, at 218-
222.
67. 'MAx, op. cit. supra note 56, at 207. See Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit &
S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41, 43 (1922).
68. See Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41, 44-45 (1922).
But see W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Stoomvaart, I U.S.S.B. 285, 289 (1933). See also note
73 infra.
69. Ibid. See also Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220, 225 (1939) ; Men-
acho v. Ward, 27 Fed. 529 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
70. One of the aims of the Shipping Act was to place large and small shippers on a
parity. See Intercoastal Investigation, 1935, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 400, 452 (1935). One of the
arguments usually made against quantity discounts is the advantage which they are sup-
posed to give to large shippers. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental
Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B. 235, 245 (1950) ; W. T. Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, I U.S.S.B.
285,292 (1933).
71. See Intercoastal Investigation, 1935, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 400, 452 (1935) ; Atlantic Re-
fining Co. v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 242, 250 (1932).
72. Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 303 (1937); Intercoastal
Investigation, 1935, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 400, 452 (1935) ; Eden Mining Co. v. Biluefields Fruit
& S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41, 45 (1922).
73. The statement in United States v. Illinois Central R.R., 263 U.S. 515, 524 (1924),
that any "difference in rates" had to be justified by "cost of services," was held applicable
to the shipping industry in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Ellernman & Bucknall S.S. Co.,
I U.S.S.B. 242, 250 (1932). For an exhaustive analysis showing that a dual rate discouit
of 9y2% was unjustified by costs where a conference controlled 901 of the trade, see
Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan, FMB Docket No. 743 (Oct. 1, 1954) (recom-
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that the dual rates charged by an intercoastal shipping conference for identical
services furnished contract and non-contract shippers were "prima fade
discriminatory," 75 and provided sufficient evidence so that the court would
not reverse an "informed" administrative judgment that the system consti-
tuted an unreasonable preference enabling the conference to "exclude com-
petitors" and establish a "practical monopoly."70G
The FMB is the proper body to make prior determination of the legality
of dual rate contract systems under the Shipping Act.77 Its findings that
particular systems are not unjustly discriminatory must be affirmed if sup-
ported by "substantial evidence" and if not contrary to law.7 8  However,
any exemption from the broad policy of the antitrust laws should be strictly
construed .7 9 And whether dual rate systems are inherently either retaliatory
or unjustly discriminatory within the meaning of the Shipping Act would
seem to involve substantial questions of statutory interpretation, justifying
careful analysis by a reviewing court.80 The forthcoming FMB decision
mended Decision of A. L. Jordan, Ex-aminer). See generally RADIUS, U'I.D STATES
SHIPPING Ix TRAsPAciFIc TRADE 1922-1938, pp. 17-20 (1944).
Dual rates may be justifiable on a cost basis in that they provide conferences assurance
of "some dependable volume of traffic." Contract Rates-North Atlantic Continental
Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 355, 373 (1954). Carriers could thereby arrange sailing.
accordingly. AV. T. Rawleigh Co. . Stoomvaart, 1 U.S.S.B. 285, 289 (1933). But see
text at note 68 supra.
74. 300 U.S. 297 (1937).
75. Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 303 (1937).
76. Id. at 303, 306. The district court in Suqyne & Hoyt found as a matter of law
that since the lower rate charged wvas "remunerative," the higher rate for similar services
must be an "undue and unreasonable exaction" which penalized the nonsigning shipper.
S-ayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1936). However, the
Supreme Court, in affirming, placed its reliance on the decision of the agency that the
particular rates were unreasonable.
77. U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Far East Con-
ference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). For general discussion of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, see note 34 supra.
78. Section 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 109(e) (1952) ; Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 304 (1937). See
also Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (1945) (FTC); Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. United States, 254 U.S. 57, 62 (1920) (ICC).
79. The Supreme Court has given strict construction to acts which provided ex-
emptions from the antitrust laws. See United States Allli Export Ass'n v. United States,
325 U.S. 196, 205-06 (1945) (Webb-Pomerene Act); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945) (Interstate Commerce Act) ; United States v. Borden Co., 303
U.S. 188, 198-203 (1939) (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act). See generally Jaffe,
Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered-The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. P'. 577, 592-
603 (1954).
80. The extent to which courts will review determinations of administrative agencie-s
cannot be predicted with certainty at the present time. See DAvis, ADMisn ivmT L~w
§§ 247-48 (1951). For judicial reversals of agency determinations on questions of
statutory interpretation, see Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) ;
Davis Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 156 (1944). Cf. Universal Camera Corp.
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in the latest Isbraidtsen case will present an opportunity for a conclusive
determination of the validity of the dual rate contract system.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). But in other cases, similar administrative holdings have
been affirmed as matters exclusively for agency determination. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. 111 (1944).
For criticism of the present judicial policy of non-interference with agency findings on
questions of "law," see Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsiblity, 67 HAv. L. REv. 436, 471-75 (1954).
See, generally, DICIaNSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSICE AND THE SUPaEMACv OF LAW, 159-74
(1927).
